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FOREWORD 
Many of the problems facing modern society involve coping with uncertainty, that 
is , making decisions on the basis of very incomplete information. This aspect of difficulty 
is perhaps most apparent in the problems of managing large-scale social and technological 
systems, which in many cases can be viewed as those of societal risk management. 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is concerned with decision 
making in the face of uncertainty in such areas as energy, agriculture, health care, and 
water resources. In particular, from the time of its founding it has investigated problems of 
risk management, ranging from controlling a forest pest to managing large-scale accidents, 
and to siting hazardous facilities. 
This paper by William C. Clark reports an investigation that was undertaken to give 
a philosophical and historical perspective to IIASA's work. While current risk-management 
methods usually apply advanced concepts of system modeling and statistical inference to 
societal decision making under uncertainty, it has generally been the case, as this paper 
points out convincingly, that risk-management problems have not revolved around obtain-
ing the correct probabilities. Rather, the problems have important political and procedural 
elements, and involve how a society collects and employs imperfect and incomplete infor-
mation. 
To put Clark's central point more broadly , the answers to today's societal risk-
management problems do not depend solely on the usual techniques of risk assessment ; 
rather, they lie in developing imaginative approaches to risk management that incorporate 
the social decision processes that must be involved. IIASA's research amply corroborates 
this point. 
Underlying Clark's paper is the belief that scientists involved in risk-management 
research today can learn much about the promises and pitfalls of various possible approaches 
through the lens of history. His paper provides such a lens - and a clear wide-angle one at 
that. His challenging exploratory inquiry provides valuable insights to workers who seek 
to guide current efforts to help society cope with its problems in an uncertain world. 
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Chairman 
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ABSTRACT 
Risk is a people problem, and people have been contending with it for 
a very long time indeed. I extract some lessons from this historical record 
and explore their implications for current and future practice of risk 
management. 
Socially relevant risk is not uncertainty of outcome, or violence of 
event, or toxicity of substance, or anything of the sort. Rather, it is a per-
ceived inability to cope satisfactorily with the world around us. Improv-
ing our ability to cope is essentially a management problem: a problem of 
identifying and carrying out the actions which will change the rules of the 
game so that the game becomes more to our liking. 
To cope better is to better understand the nature of risks and how they 
develop. It is naive and destructive to pretend that such understanding 
can carry with it the certainties and completeness of traditional science. 
Risk management lies in the realm of trans-science, of ill-structured 
problems, of messes. In analyzing risk messes, the central need is to 
evaluate, order, and structure inevitably incomplete and conflicting 
knowledge so that the . management acts can be chosen with the best 
possible understanding of current knowledge, its limitations, and its 
implications. This requires an undertaking in policy analysis, rather than 
science. 
One product of such analyses is a better conceptualization of 
"feasibility" in risk management. Past and present efforts have too often 
and too uncritically equated the feasible with the desirable. Results have 
been both frustrating and wasteful. 
Another is an emphasis on the design of resilient or "soft-fail" coping 
strategies. The essential issue is not optimality or efficiency, but robust-
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ness to the unknowns on which actual coping performance is contingent. 
The most important lesson of both experience and analysis is that 
societies' abilities to cope with the unknown depend on the flexibility of 
their institutions and individuals, and on their capability to experiment 
freely with alternative forms of adaptation to the risks which threaten 
them. 
Neither the witch hunting hysterics nor the mindlessly rigid regula-
tions characterizing so much of our present chapter in the history of risk 
management say much for our ability to learn from the past. 
FEAR, RISK, AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
CLARK 
At the center of the risk problem are people and their fears . Fears ofloss, fears of 
injury, and - most of all - fears of the unknown. How we cope with those fears 
affects both the material well-being, and the spiritual character of the individuals 
and societies we become. 
Students of risk therefore face a number of difficulties in addressing their subject 
matter, and surely one of the most serious is that of establishing a useful perspec-
tive. The fears of risk are our fears, the people making and taking risks are our-
selves and our neighbors. When we intellectualize ourselves away from these 
ambiguities, our work becomes sterile, our subjects ciphers. When we tackle them 
directly, our involvement makes critical interpretation impossible and broader 
interpretations irrelevant. Unable to see inside the problem, we trivialize it. Una-
ble to see outside the problem, we become part of it. 
I suspect that work on contemporary risks will always contain some elements of 
this contradiction. To better appreciate the problem we are in, to better orient our 
directions for the future, a backward look into the history of societal risk assess-
ment therefore seems in order. With the perspective of time, we should be able to 
perceive some of the pitfalls and opportunities of risk management which our inti-
mate involvement in the contemporary scene denies us. 
Unfortunately, what must have been a truly monumental environmental impact 
assessment on the Seven Days of Creation has been lost. But societal risk assess-
ment nonetheless has a history as long as man's efforts to explain, manipulate, and 
cope with his fears and the unknown. Much of this is still accessible to us, and 
should have some lessons to teach. That at least is a possibility, and one that has 
not yet been explored. 
For several years now I have been trying to convince some competent historians 
to undertake a retrospective study of societal risk, all to no avail. The present 
historical "essay" is the result, and I emphasize that I use the term in its original 
sense of an amateur's first attempt. That attempt has been fun, and has provided 
me some interesting perspectives on our present risk dilemmas. I hope its 
transgressions of historical fact will sufficiently outrage professionals that their 
rebuttals can begin the serious study which I seriously do believe is needed. 
In the next three sections I review what seem to me three particularly instructive 
episodes in the history of social risk assessment. The European witch craze of the 
16th and 17th centuries is treated in the first section, some North American 
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experience in renewable resource management in the second section, and medical 
drug regulation in the third. The historical perspective derived from these three 
studies is then used to shed some light on the unasked question of "What are we 
arguing about?" in the contemporary risk debate. Finally, I look forward to the 
prospects for adaptive design of risk management policy. 
WITCH HUNTS: ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK* 
For several centuries spanning the Renaissance and Reformation, societal risk 
assessment meant witch hunting. Contemporary accounts record wheat inexplica-
bly rotting in the fields, sheep dying of unknown causes, vineyards smitten with 
unseasonable frost, human disease and impotence on the rise. In other words, a 
litany of life's sorrows not very different from those which concern us today. 
The institutionalized expertise of that earlier time resided with the Church. 
Then, as now, the experts were called upon to provide explanation of the unknown 
and to mitigate its undesirable consequences. Rather than seek particular sources 
of particular evils, rather than acknowledge their own limitations and ignorance, 
these experts assigned the generic name of "witchcraft" to the phenomenology of 
the unknown. Having a name, they proceeded to found a new professional interest 
dedicated to its investigation and control. 
As the true magnitude of the witch problem became more apparent, the Church 
enlisted the Inquisition, an applied institution specifically designed to address 
pressing social concerns. The Inquisition became the growth industry of the day, 
offering exciting work, rapid advancement, and wide recognition to its professional 
and technical workers. Its creative and energetic efforts to create a witch-free world 
unearthed dangers in the most unlikely places; the rates of witch identification, 
assessment and evaluation soared. By the dawn of the Enlightenment, witches had 
been virtually eliminated from Europe and North America. Crop failures, disease, 
and general misfortune had not. And more than half a million people had been 
burned at the stake, largely "for crimes they committed in someone else's 
dreams" [2, p. 2211. 
How did the expert institutions of the day come to wreak such havoc on the peo-
ple they sought to protect? Answers to this question provide some useful perspec-
tives for our present attempts to assess societal risk. 
Witches and witchcraft can be traced back to the very beginnings of history. For 
centuries, people had found "witc~es" a convenient label for their fears of the 
unknown, an adequate explanation for the inevitable misfortunes which befell 
one's crops, health, and happiness. For centuries, the Church adopted a skeptical 
and largely academic approach to these explanations, preaching the difference bet-
ween fact and fantasy, and placing witches squarely in the latter category. 
Witchcraft, if it existed at all, was an illusion sent by the devil. These illusions were 
•This section draws from Trevor-Roper fl], Harris {2], Duerr {3], and Summer's translation of the Ma lieus 
[4]. 
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frowned upon and even prohibited by law. But individual witches and witch 
mongers were not sought out by the Church and, if brought to its attention, were 
merely advised of their errors and urged to desist. Persistent individuals were 
simply excommunicated. The social structure, represented by the Church, dec-
lared itself no longer interested in or responsible for the welfare of those 
individuals. If the miscreants chose to ignore responsible advice, their subsequent 
fate was their own business, and the devil's. Witches remained an individualized 
risk, requiring individual responses by individual members of the Church and lay 
communities. 
Wildavsky [5] has spoken of the "watershed" which is passed when such 
individualized issues are collectivized under unified social policies. Institor and 
Sprenger's Malleus Maleficarum (The Hammer of the Witches, published in 1486) 
was for the witch hunting business that collective consciousness watershed which 
Kefauver's Hearings would later be for drug regulators, and Rachel Carson's Silent 
Spring for environmentalists. Massive in its scope and evidence, impelling in its 
argument, the Mal/eus showed that witches did in fact exist, with real power for 
evil. As agents of Satan, they were a heresy - a dangerous sin in need of eradica-
tion. Not individuals, but society as a whole was in peril as long as witches 
remained at large. Pope Innocent VIII credited this argument, and his bull Summis 
desiderantes affectibus authorized full application of the Inquisition, including tor-
ture, to the eradication of witches. The witch risk, to use another of Wildavsky's 
[5] terms, had been "socialized". Collective action by the central authority was 
henceforth required, and any action taken against a particular individual was 
justified in the name of the common good. In the case of the witch hunts, this 
"common good" justified the carbonization of five hundred thousand individuals, 
the infliction of untold suffering, and the generation of a climate of fear and dis-
trust - all in the name of the most elite and educated institution of the day. 
Modern risk assessors do not incinerate their fellow citizens. Furthermore, they 
seek to insure against milder forms of witch hunting by a scientific approach to 
gathering and evaluating evidence on risk issues. But the history of witch hunting 
suggests that what we say we are doing or wish to be doing in contemporary risk 
assessment may be far removed from what actually occurs. Again, the historical 
perspective may help us to recognize some of these discrepancies, and to provide a 
basis for their rectification. 
The institutionalized efforts of the Church to control witches can be seen, in 
retrospect, to have led to witch proliferation. Early preaching against witchcraft and 
its evils almost certainly put the idea of witches into many a head which never 
would have imagined such things if left to its own devices. The harder the Inquisi-
tion looked, the bigger its staff, the stronger its motivation, the more witches it dis-
covered. Similar trends have been documented in the modern literature on hazard 
and have long posed difficulties for those seeking to document the crime preven-
tion effectiveness of larger policy forces [e.g. 6, Fig. 1-11. A general question 
therefore arises concerning the causal relationship between assessment and risk: 
Which is driving which? A strong case can be made for the notion that search 
effort creates the thing being sought. Since the resulting higher discovery rate of 
witch risks obviously justifies more search effort, the whole process becomes self-
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contained and self-amplifying, with no prospect of natural limitation based on 
some externally determined "objective" frequency of witch risks in the environ-
ment. 
The way we ask questions, and the kinds of evidence we admit in our attempts to 
answer them, are of the utmost importance here. The Inquisition asked "Are you a 
witch?" and proceeded to examine the evidence to see if you were. Today, 
whatever we title our symposia, we ask "Is this a risk?" and proceed accordingly. 
In neither case is there any conceivable empirical observation which could logically 
force an answer "No!". In neither case is there a "stopping rule" which can 
logically terminate the investigation short of a revelation of guilt. 
In witch hunting, accusation was tantamount to conviction. Acquittal was arbitr-
ary, dependent on the flagging zeal of the prosecutor. It was always reversible if 
new evidence appeared. You couldn't win, and you could only leave the game by 
losing. The Inquisition's principal tool for identifying witches was torture. The 
accused was asked if she was a witch. If she said no, what else would you expect of a 
witch? So she was tortured until she confessed the truth. The Inquisitors justified 
ever more stringent tortures on the grounds that it would be prohibitively 
dangerous for a real witch to escape detection. Of course an innocent person would 
never confess to being a witch (a heretic with no prospects of salvation) under 
mere physical suffering. The few who lived through such tests were likely to spend 
the rest of their lives as physical or mental cripples. Most found it easier to give up 
and burn. 
And today? What is not a risk with a parts-per-trillion test can always be exposed 
to a parts-per-billion examination. If rats cope with the heaviest dose of a chemical 
that can be soaked into their food and water, you can always gavage them. Or try 
mice or rabbits. Again, the only stopping rule is discovery of the sought-for effect, 
or exhaustion of the investigator (or his funds). Many of the risk assessment pro-
cedures used today are logically indistinguishable from those used by the Inquisi-
tion. The absence of "stopping rules" means that both fail to meet Popper's [7] 
"demarcation" criterion for true science. Since neither is advancing falsifiable pro-
positions, neither is capable of producing anything more than propaganda in sup-
port of its own prejudices.• 
Modern science's defense against self-delusion relies upon a spirit of open and 
critical inquiry. This, though hardly infallible, ostensibly uncovers errors and 
thereby proceeds towards objective truth. Once again, however, exactly the same 
high principle failed in actual practice during the heyday of the Inquisition. Within 
the 16th century Church, hardly a voice was raised against the witch hunt, while 
those outside defended the accused only at great personal risk. After all, argued the 
Malleus, with such crop losses,. child mortality, marital infidelity, and general aches 
and pains as exist today, "Who is so dense as to maintain . . . that all their 
witchcraft and injuries are phantastic and imaginary, when the contrary is evident 
to the senses of everybody?" Who, indeed? Only those in league with the devil. 
•on "propaganda" in this context, see Feyerabend {8}. It is worth noting that both witch hunts and risk assess-
ments also/ail to meet Kuhn's weaker "puzzle solving" criterion of science {see 9}. 
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And so the few philosophers and physicians who did speak up against the hunts 
were themselves harassed, excommunicated, and in many instances burned along 
with the witches. 
Today, anyone querying the zeal of the risk assessors is accused at least of 
callousness, in words almost identifical to those used by the Ma lieus five hundred 
years ago. The accused's league with the devil against society is taken for granted. 
Persecution in the press, courts, and hearing rooms is unremitting, and even the 
weak rules of evidence advanced by the "science" of risk assessment are swept 
away in the heat of the chase (see section on medical drug regulation below). This 
is not to say that risks don't exist, or that assessors are venal. It is to insist that 
skeptical, open inquiry remains theory rather than practice in the majority of 
today's risk debates. That those debates are so often little more than self-deluding 
recitations of personal faith should not be surprising. 
A last insight into our modern treatment of risk evidence comes from the 
historical demise of witch hunting as a profession. In 1610, after a century of witch 
hunting, the exceptional Inquisitor Alonso Salazar y Frias carried out an extensive 
analysis of witch burnings at Logrono, Navarre. He showed that most of the 
original accusations had been false, that torture had created witches where none 
exist~, and that there was not a single case of actual witchcraft to show for all the 
preaching, hunting, and burning which had been carried out in the name of the 
Church. He did not rule on whether witches existed. He did order that the Spanish 
Inquisition no longer use torture under any circumstances, and that accusations no 
longer be considered unless supported by independent evidence. The number of 
witches brought to trial declined precipitously. 
In modern terms, y Frias had instituted a grand jury condition between accusa-
tion and trial. Further, he had introduced rules of evidence which recognized the 
perverse and essentially meaningless forms which unstructured "facts" could 
take. Neither of these reforms has yet been introduced into major streams of the 
contemporary risk debate. And very few retrospective studies of the sort carried 
out by y Frias have yet been conducted by the modern risk assessment com-
munity.* When we realize that y Frias' study occurred only after a century of active 
witch hunting, and that the practice was not completely stamped out until more 
than a centurey later, the prospect of rationalizing contemporary risk assessment 
seems distant indeed. 
It is all very well to note the psychological and evidential problems which led the 
Church to protect its fold by burning goodly numbers of them. But witch hunts 
continued as an organized political activity for over two hundred years, and it 
requires a certain credulity to pass off such persistence as a product of excess zeal 
and logical error. We may be forgiven for joining the lawyers in asking "Cui 
bono?": Who benefited from this complex, expensive, and destructive undertak-
ing? 
*The invaluable studies of Lawless (10} focus on cases where a serious risk existed, but was recognized late. 
Missing are the complementary studies of legislated restrictions where no risk existed. I discuss some 
retrospective looks in the matter of drug regulation below. 
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Anthropologist Marvin Harris has pointed out that to believe that the main pur-
pose of the witch hunters was the annihilation of witches is to accept uncritically 
the lifestyle consciousness professed by the witch hunting community. Looking at 
"its earthly results rather than its heavenly intentions" (2, p. 237), the witch hunt 
supports a rather different interpretation. Whether individual witch hunters sin-
cerely believed in what they were doing is not the point. As with risk assessment 
today, what actually happens may be radically different from what people think is 
happening. The benefit of our historical perspective on the witch phenomenon is 
that, with hindsight, we can see that difference, and try to learn from it. 
To begin with, there was certainly an element of opportunistic careerism in the 
Inquisition, and there is almost certainly an element of opportunistic careerism in 
the present risk assessment movement. However small this element, it is clear that 
it can do a lot of damage to the world that the profession is trying to protect, and 
can bring the profession into disrepute in the process. The same reform Inquisitor 
Alonso Salazar y Frias who restructured the rational side of the witch hunt was evi-
dently a worldly man as well. Besides instituting grand jury hearings and rules of 
evidence, he revoked the law that property of a convicted witch could be confis-
cated by the Church. Again, the rate of witchcraft accusations plummeted. It is 
interesting to speculate on what might constitute a similar perturbation experiment 
for today's risk assessors. 
A second point illuminating the witch hunt phenomenon is that virtually no 
members of the clergy or aristocracy were accused, much less executed.* At best, 
the profession was evidently incapable of coping with findings which refracted on 
itself. In fact, it reacted like a powerful elite which finds its own ox is about to be 
gored. One assumes that heretics accusing these privileged elites were promptly 
identified as the devil's agents. Anyone who has followed the recent debates over 
the risk of recombinant DNA research** will recognize that things haven't 
changed much, and can imagine the outrage with which the Church must have 
reacted to accusations upon its own house. The same episode justifies a certain 
skepticism regarding the presumption that today's science community is willing to 
pursue its risk assessment activities into areas striking close to home. 
A third historical issue is less firmly established but, for purposes of understand-
ing the present risk enterprise, much more significant. Harris continues his 
analysis of the witch hunts with an argument that they functioned directly to 
increase the power of the elite institutions which conducted them, and 
simultaneously directed discontent against those institutions into relatively non-
threatening channels: 
The poor came to believe that they were being victimized by witches and 
devils instead of princes and popes ... Against the people's phantom 
•H.C.E. Midlefort (Witch Hunting in Southwestern Germany, Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, 1972) shows 
that of 1258 executions between 1562 and 1684, 82% were female. Three members of the nobility were 
accused, and none were executed . 
.. For a review, see P.B. Hull. Research on Recombinant DNA: The Regulatory Issues. South. Calif. Law 
Rev., 51: (6) 1435-1450, 1978. 
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enemies, Church and State mounted a bold campaign. The authorities were 
unstinting in their efforts to ward off this evil, and the rich and poor alike 
could be thankful for the energy and bravery displayed in the battle. The 
practical significance of the witch mania therefore was that it shifted respon-
sibility for the crisis of late medieval society from both Church and State to 
imaginary demons in human form . .. Not only were the Church and State 
exonerated, but they were made indispensable. The clergy and nobility 
emerged as the great protectors of mankind against an enemy who was 
omnipresent but difficult to detect [2 , pp. 237-238]. 
Valid or not, there is an obvious modern parallel to this interpretation of the 
witch craze. Science has been under growing attack in recent years for a variety of 
ills ranging from wasting the tax dollar, to pompus arrogance, to greedily destroy-
ing our environment for short-term personal gain. The science establishment has 
recognized this, and governments are now funding grand programs on "research 
applied to national needs" . Individual scientists, with all the good will in the world, 
speak of the need for "critical science" focussed on just such needs. If profession~l 
interests such as risk assessment continue on their present course, it will not be 
long before science can display its difficult and unstinting efforts to ward off evil, 
its indispensability as ''great protectors of mankind against an enemy who is 
omnipresent but difficult to detect". This scenario does not require venality, but 
only self-interest and self-delusion. For that reason alone, it merits our attention. 
To read too directly from the witch hunts of the 16th and 17th centuries to the 
risk assessments of the present would be to fall into the trap of historical determin-
ism. To declare without further ado that "It can't happen here" would be to dis-
play naivete of another sort. At a minimum, as Trevor-Roper [1] has argued, the 
existence of the witch craze in the midst of the Renaissance is "a standing warning 
to those who would simplify the stages of human progress." 
The "new professional interest of risk assessment" is not necessarily a 
progressive step. Neither its professed rational-scientific foundations nor its con-
cern for collectively redressing ills of the human condition are enough, in them-
selves, to make it so. Both the potential for bettering human life and the potential 
for witch hunting are latent in contemporary risk concerns. Our pressing task is to 
learn how we can cultivate one aspect of this Janus-faced creature while suppress-
ing the other. In the next section I consider some more recent risk assessment 
experience which illuminates further aspects of this problem. 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: ON THE FUNCTION OF UNCERTAINTY* 
Some particularly useful insights on the basic nature of risk phenomena can be 
drawn from a consideration of man's attempts to manage environmental 
"This section is based on the work of my colleagues at the Institute of Resource Ecology, University of British 
Columbia {l J, 12}, and on Jan Burton, Gilbert White, and Robert Kates 's studies on man 's relationships with 
environmental hazards [13, 14, 15}. 
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resources. The dual character of "risk" is again apparent. The river that brings 
water, irrigation, and transport also brings floods. The plants and animals with 
which we cohabit the earth provide us with oxygen, food , labor, and a variety of 
more subtle benefits. Under other circumstances, they may compete with us as 
"pests", attack us as diseases, or inconsiderately disappear under the various 
demands we place on them. 
There is nothing witch-like or imaginary about the risks encountered through 
our relations with such resources. Failure to cope leads not to the ambiguities of 
future purgatory, but to the definite and immediate consequences of drowning, 
starvation, and consumption. 
Anthropological studies have shown that pre-industrial "folk" societies adjust 
to such environmental risks largely through modifications in human behavior. 
From an external perspective, these adaptations often appear mystical and ara-
tional. On closer examination, they often exhibit the notable virtues of being effec-
tive a good deal of the time, of being flexible and easily adapted, of requiring action 
only at the individual or small group level, and of imposing little stress on the 
environmental system as a whole [15, p. 982; see also 16, 17). Modern industrial 
societies have tended to pursue an opposite course of adaptation, controlling and 
reducing the variability of nature by means of large, long duration, capital inten-
sive "engineering" projects. These have indubitably succeeded in achieving many 
of their short-term goals. But a look at the historical record shows that many of 
those gains have been bought in exchange for expensive and unanticipated long-
term consequences. We have begun to discover that variability and uncertainty are 
in fact important "structural" factors, responsible in large part for the way our 
environmental and resource systems work. In general, they cannot be removed or 
reduced without precipitating major changes in those "workings" . In particular, 
the control of small, frequent fluctuations has resulted time and again in a growing 
vulnerability to rare but large perturbations. Consider some particular examples. 
Throughout the middle part of this century, the United States devoted unprece-
dented expenditures to the control of river flooding. By 1960, however, it was clear 
that the country's increasing flood control efforts were supporting an ever rising 
level of flood loss and damage [18]. As might have been expected, there followed a 
great deal of acrimonious debate amongst the flood-protection industries, Con-
gress, flood victims, and sundry academics. The facts were denied, explained away, 
attributed to extraneous factors, and so on. But gradually there grew a body of evi-
dence showing that the early technological view of flood risk protection had been 
seriously incomplete. People, together with their reactions to perceived flood fre-
quency, had been left out of the picture. When empoundment and levee construc-
tion made former flood plains less prone to flooding, people reacted by moving 
into areas which now appeared "safe enough". Good control of normal river fluc-
tuations was indeed achieved, and the previously farmed lands became more and 
more densely settled, their flooding history a more and more distant reality. When 
an exceptional flood eventually did exceed capacity of the flood works - or, much 
more rarely, when those works failed under less than their designed tolerances -
the floods which resulted caused unprecedented damage [14, 18). Only now are 
comprehensive strategies, incorporating the human element, beginning to be 
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devised. And these, almost without exception, are emphasizing mitigation and 
flexibility of response rather than the old litany of flood "control" [13]. 
A related phenomenon is documented repeatedly in the pest control literature. 
For example, in the period 1947-1974, agricultural use of insecticides in the 
United States increased over ten-fold. Over the same period, the rate of crop loss 
to insect pests rose by a factor of two [19]. In American corn production, while the 
acreage treated for pests has risen from 1 % to 52%, crop losses have risen nearly 
four-fold [ 19]. Nor can we simply stop using insecticides and hope things will go 
back to their original variable but endurable state of affairs. Though this might be 
possible in some theoretical long run, the short-term implications for farmers and 
food supply would be devastating. We are, sadly but simply, hooked on a risk con-
trol policy which gives us little, but which we can no longer do without. The broad 
result of our efforts to control pest risks has been to increase not only immediate 
damages, but also vulnerability to future surprises. There is no simple explanation 
for these seemingly perverse relationships. In some individual crops the results 
have been better. In others the losses are in part due to changes in tillage and usage 
practice which accompanied the increases of insecticides. But in many well-studied 
cases, it is clear that man's crude efforts to eliminate natural variability in the 
resource system are directly responsible for the ensuing debacle. 
One such case is documented by Canadian studies of the spruce budworm [20]. 
Under natural conditions, this normally rare insect erupts into epidemics at inter-
vals of 30 or more years, defoliating and killing a good proportion of the older con-
iferous forest as it does so. This forest destruction eliminates the insects' habitat, 
the outbreak collapses, and a healthy, young forest grows back in its wake. But 
these temporal uncertainties make efficient commercial utilization of the forest 
impossible, and insecticides were applied to control an incipient eruption in the 
1950's. By preserving the forest in a mature condition - by reducing its variability 
- this policy also preserved the biological conditions which precipitated the erup-
tion in the first place. Today, under the relatively unvarying conditions of insec-
ticide "control", budworms have spread throughout the entire province of New 
Brunswick where they persist at intermediate to high densities. Continuous, 
expensive applications of insecticides are required to prevent an epidemic. The 
forest and forest industry are more vulnerable, and at greater risk, than ever 
before, should the control policy fail or be abandoned. The most intensive analyses 
of this dilemna have been unable to design remedial policies with any but the most 
painful withdrawal symptoms. 
Not surprisingly, a number of parallels to these pest-control histories can be 
found in man's efforts to control human disease [11, 21]. The case of poliomyelitis 
provides an especially illuminating example. It seems that prior to the 20th century 
severe cases of polio were rare. Minor infections were probably contracted by most 
children, producing immunity but few obvious symptoms in most. By the 19th 
century, however, improved living conditions and public health measures - in 
part introduced to combat cholera and other "unsanitary" diseases - had begun 
to isolate the more well-to-do segments of society from their traditional childhood 
exposures to various diseases. The reduced frequency of contact meant that these 
"diseases of cleanliness" were often first encountered in adult life, with violent or 
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fatal results. 
This growing toll of polio cases, perversely focussed on the most meticulously 
hygienic classes, fuelled the successful search for a vaccine. By the late 1950's, the 
incidence of polio was again extremely low in the United States and an organized 
scheme of inoculations was reaching a very large proportion of the school-age 
population. Once again, however, there is some suggestion that this "control" of 
uncertainty and fluctuation may well have increased vulnerability to large-scale 
disaster. Today, polio has become for many a threat of the distant past. Public 
health officials are finding it harder and harder to guarantee that significant propor-
tions of the population are not missed by immunization and booster campaigns. It 
has been suggested that the growing complacency over the "non-risk" of polio 
may well be leading us to conditions which could support a major epidemic. The 
same is true for a variety of other diseases [see 11, 21]. 
Obviously, public health and vaccination campaigns have done a great deal of 
good, and will continue to do so in the future. But the reduced frequency of disease 
brought by vaccination programs is invariably accompanied by increased risks of 
other sorts. Such alternative risk structures - not the simplistic myths of natural 
exposure versus ultimate eradication - should be the focus of policy discussions 
and analysis in each particular disease case. Such explicit weighing of realistic alter-
natives is not particularly in evidence. German measles vaccinations for children 
are a case in point. Here, in exchange for protecting small children against a 
relatively mild illness, we leave adults susceptible to disastrous and debilitating 
attacks. It seems virtually certain that a broader perspective would encourage the 
disease in childhood, and vaccinate only adults who have missed natural exposure 
in their youth. As elsewhere, however, a simplistic and counterproductive pre-
dilection for "control" per se has so far prevailed. 
The unpleasant surprises historically associated with efforts to manage pest and 
disease risks might be passed off as special consequences of introducing exotic 
substances into complex biological systems. But precisely the same sorts of unan-
ticipated results have been encountered in apparently straightforward efforts to 
reduce the risk of forest fire in America's National Parks [2]. Once again, initial 
efforts were successful, leading to adoption of the policy throughout the park 
system. Only later did it become clear that brush and scrub unnaturally accumu-
lated in the absence of small periodic fires were providing fuel for conflagrations of 
a size and intensity never before experienced. Again, "withdrawal" from the 
initially successful risk-reduction policy has been delicate and expensive in the 
extreme [11]. 
A final example of the relationships among uncertainty, risk, and resource 
management concerns the r.ole of genetic variation. Studies in evolutionary biology 
have shown that variable environments give rise to populations with substantial 
genetic differences in traits relevant to the populations' survival. One genetic type 
will be slightly better adapted to one type of environmental condition, one to 
another, and so on. As a result, over a wide range of environmental conditions, 
disturbances, and surprises, some members of the population will do relatively 
well. The occasional variation in the environment shifts the balance and prevents 
one form from replacing all the others. It is true, however, that if environmental 
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conditions can be kept constant, one form highly adapted to those conditions will 
usually do better than a mix of forms. In agriculture, this situation has led to the 
breeding and distribution of genetically pure crop strains supremely well adapted to 
the controlled (low risk) conditions of water and nutrient availability which 
modern farms can provide. 
A sobering lesson in the risks of such strategies was delivered to American corn 
producers in 1964 [23). Huge tracts of land were by then planted in a single genetic 
strain of high yield corn. When a disease arose to which this particular strain was 
not resistant, a very large proportion of the crop was lost. Disaster was averted 
because some resistant strains were still available and could be used to replace the 
susceptible one. As a result of this and similar surprises, much more attention is 
now being devoted to the development and preservation of mixed genetic stocks in 
agriculture. The lower short-term yields obtainable from such approaches is judged 
an acceptable price to pay for the increased ability to cope with the unexpected.• 
Looking across these diverse examples of resource management experience, 
several common themes stand out. In each case, uncertainty or variability in the 
natural system was initially viewed as a source of risk/hazard. Without exception, 
it was assumed that removal of the variability would be an unmitigated good, 
resulting in reduced risk and improved performance of the resource system. 
Initial successes led to optimism that the proposed management policy would be 
an effective one. But they also led to changes in the system itself. In each case, the 
existence of variability and uncertainty turned out to have played an important role 
in establishing and maintaining key relationships among the system components. 
With that variability removed, relationships shifted to accommodate the new 
reality: people settled the unflooded flood-plain, budworms spread through the 
undefoliated forest, brush accumulated on the unburned understory, and so on. As 
a result, the decreased frequency of variation in. the system was accompanied by 
increased vulnerability to and cost of variation when it finally broke loose from 
managerial controls. Management efforts had changed the kinds of risks encoun-
tered, but not the fact of risk. And more often than not, management shifted the 
risk structure from one sort people were accustomed to dealing with to one they 
had never before experienced. 
Failures and surprises of the sort described here have been instrumental in sen-
sitizing managers to the internal role played by variability in resource systems. 
Detailed investigation have begun to tease out the mechanisms involved in this 
sensitivity, and to let us make use of it in our policy designs [e.g. 111. But if we 
have learned something about the different structures which variation and uncer-
tainty can take, our ignorance still remains more substantial than our knowledge. It 
is now clear that we are unlikely to reduce unpleasant surprises in resource 
management merely by increasing knowledge or imposing crude "controls". 
•Unfortunately, it seems that we need to learn this lesson anew for each resource system. Present efforts to 
enhance the production of salmonid fish stocks in the Pacific Northwest seem likely to select for dangerously 
narrow genetic stocks throughout the system (K.H. Loftus," Science for Canada 's fisheries rehabilitation 
needs," J. Fish. Res. Board Can. 33: 1822-1857, 1976.). 
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Rather, we must learn to design resource management schemes so that they can 
better cope with the failures which are guaranteed by our ignorance and the 
inherent variability of resource systems. This need for designing "soft-failure", 
uncertainty-tolerant management policies is receiving growing attention in areas 
beyond resource management (24]. Coupled with a concern for increased institu-
tional flexibility, it forms the core of an approach to adaptive management which 
my colleagues and I at IIASA and the University of British Columbia have been 
exploring over the last few years [ 12). At the end of this paper, I will discuss some 
of the implications of this adaptive management notion for societal assessment of 
complex, incompletely known risk systems. First, however, I wish to consider one 
more set of historical lessons, this time taken from a field in which solid scientific 
knowledge of risk is at its most complete. 
DRUG SAFETY: THE LIMITS OF REGULATION 
The history of drug development and regulation shows the risk assessment 
profession at its best. The products in question are medicines designed from the 
beginning to combat specific ills of man and to improve directly his health and 
well-being. In return for their favors, medicines themselves pose risks, but of a 
very special kind. 
First, exposure to the risk is limited to those seeking the related benefits. 
Second, the risk is undertaken in close consultation with a professional trained to 
help his patient balance personal risks, benefits, and alternatives in particular cir-
cumstances. Third, the nature of the risk itself has been carefully investigated, 
evaluated, and described through rigorous and sophisticated experimental 
investigations. 
Each of these features of medical drugs should make their assessment and 
regulation easy relative to other risk situations. In fact, people dealing with nuc-
lear, toxic chemical, or even traffic risks would almost certainly be thankful if even 
one of the properties listed above pertained to their systems. Looking at the history 
of drug safety efforts over the last several decades, we might therefore expect to 
learn something about the best that can be hoped for from risk assessments in 
other less mature and tractable fields. 
This task is facilitated by the National Academy of Sciences' sponsorship a few 
years ago of a symposium with the famililar title "How Safe is Safe?". That sym-
posium reviewed experience in the design of policy on drug development and 
regulation (25). Papers were presented by a variety of senior drug regulators, pro-
ducers, and consumers. With the recorded discussion, these papers provide a lively 
review of the current debate on drug safety issues. In so doing they raise serious 
questions regarding the limits of risk management. I review some of these below. 
The basic procedures for risk-benefit assessments of medical drugs are well 
established. Preliminary screening makes use of extensive information and 
experience on similar products. Promising candidates move on to limited trials in 
lower animals, intensive evaluations in higher animal forms, and finally to closely 
supervised clinical trials on volunteer human subjects (26). Real differences of 
Referencespp. 311-313. 
300 CLARK 
opinion arise not regarding the logic of this basic plan but on the judgmental issue 
of how much, and what kind of, assurance is needed before drugs are approved for 
human consumption. 
If a drug is approved with minimal testing to make it quickly available to those 
who need it, people may be the guinea pigs who reveal unanticipated side effects: 
The specter of thalidomide is never far in the background when more rapid licens-
ing procedures are debated. On the other hand, efforts to approach zero risk 
through exhaustive pre-release testing are extremely expensive and time-consum-
ing. New drugs are delayed in reaching those who need them, and marginal* drugs 
may not be developed at all. 
Dilemmas of this sort exist in most risk management situations. The drug case is 
virtually unique, however, in that different solutions have been adopted in 
different countries, providing a prospect for empirical comparisons of regulatory 
efficacy. The two most thoroughly exercised and extreme solutions are those 
adopted by the United States and United Kingdom. The U. S. emphasizes inten-
sive pre-market testing to mitigate the risk of unanticipated side-effects, while the 
U. K. promotes prompter release, relying heavily on an extensive system of post-
marketing monitoring. 
The explicit comparisons which have been carried out between these two 
approaches are in no sense definitive or free from methodological problems. With 
some unanimity, however, they conclude that the U. K. practice better advances 
the public interest [26, 27, 28]. American regulatory caution is argued to be need-
lessly expensive, stifling of new product development, and not superior in its 
ability to assure drug safety. In particular, the stringent safety testing procedures 
instituted in the United States following the Kefauver hearings and thalidomide 
episode of the early 1960's, are demonstrated to have been a mistake in classic 
risk-benefit terms [9]. The clear and vociferously stated conclusion of such studies 
is that some more rational form of regulation, including less expensive and time-
consuming assessment procedures, is long overdue for the U. S. drug industry. 
But while American drug regulators and risk assessors are being condemned as 
overly conservative by collective social welfare studies of the sort cited above, 
powerful, articulate, and convincing consumer groups are simultaneously attack-
ing them for "caving in to industry" and neglecting their responsibility to assure 
the public's safety [e.g. 30]. Advocates of this position cite the regulators' failures 
to detect risks which "could have been" detected, and their ambiguous reactions 
to ambiguous evidence as proof that the public safety is too important to be left to 
even the best of safety experts. The beleaguered regulators have accepted con-
sumer representation on their drug review panels, without anyone being sure just 
what those representatives are supposed to represent. Congress has responded to 
the political importance of drug safety by almost continual intervention in and 
reorganization of FDA. Significantly, however, Congress' direct attempts at 
*I use "marginal" here in the economic sense of low market potential, low profitability products. Some of these 
may be literally a matter of life and death to the few who need them, and pharmaceutical concerns do market 
some "public interest" drugs on which they will never make a profit. But one cost of regulation will always be 
to make some such marginal drugs not worth developing by even the most public spirited of concerns. 
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"representative" safety regulation have resembled nothing so much as Keystone 
Cops scenarios (e.g. DES, saccharine). And Congress has failed repeatedly to meet 
FDA's own requests for an unambiguous legislative mandate specifying what 
balance of risks and benefits does constitute the public good, how this is to be 
democratically determined and achieved. 
What emerges from the "How Safe is Safe?" debate in the drug field is that, for 
better or worse, public safety is now and is likely to remain a primarily political 
issue. Scientific data and economic analyses - even of the inordinately high 
quality encountered in the drug field - are simply not going to be the central issue 
in even the most technical of risk decisions. 
This is not to say that science, data, and rigorous analysis are irrelevant to actual 
decisions in drug licensing. Nor does it suggest that carefully reasoned risk assess-
ments do not have a role to play in other fields, even when these are destined to 
deal in even greater ambiguities of "objective" analysis than do drug safety trials. 
It does suggest, and strongly, that the would-be "professional interest of risk 
assessment" must reconsider its basic goals, and reassess its own potential for real 
contribution to the public interest. 
One direction which such a reconsideration might profitably explore is suggested 
by Joshua Lederberg's "systems analytic" contribution to the drug safety sym-
posium cited earlier [30). He argues that contemporary safety testing procedures, 
even in the drug field, often resemble catechismal obstacle courses. These pro-
cedures undoubtedly do make it very time-consuming and expensive to introduce 
new products or proposals, but rarely has any effort been made to determine 
whether they actually do catch the hazards to which they ostensibly are a response. 
Some of the drug screening evaluations already cited in this section suggest that 
they often do not [e.g. 29). Furthermore, the cases I discussed in the earlier section 
on resource management suggest that simplistic or intuitively plausible "safety" 
measures may frequently increase total risk. 
Lederberg concludes that we must come to treat the issues of drug regulation 
and management as problems of experimental design. Instead of routine 
adherence to large scale screening experiments on mice, or bizarre attempts to 
determine cancer "causing" dosages of some agent, he calls for "creative 
investigations that look for problems on the basis of some theoretical rationale" 
[31, p. 80). It is the development of such rationales, rather than of arcane 
methodological treatments for eventually irrelevant data, which constitutes the 
central scientific challenge of contemporary risk assessment. 
At a more prosaic level, Lederberg's call for an experimental design approach in 
drug safety regulation can be extended to the way in which we make use of 
experience and information that we already possess. The comparative evaluations 
of regulatory performance referred to earlier are valuable attempts to advance the 
public interest. On closer examination, however, they offer little actual policy gui-
dance. Virtually no regulatory activity in any field has ever been shown to have a 
clean bill of health when subject to essentially economic evaluation [32). To con-
clude from such analyses that we need "less regulation", or "deregulation'', may 
not be wrong, but neither is it particularly instructive. The "don't regulate" vs. 
"do regulate" choice is a sterile and artificial one. To begin creating effective 
References pp. 311-313. 
302 CLARK 
policies of risk management, we must surely begin to view these issues at a finer 
level of resolution. We need carefully designed studies to show what kinds of risks 
our present testing procedures can catch, and which kinds of risks they let slip by. 
Armed with such knowledge, we could begin to determine the kinds of tasks which 
various post-marketing monitoring schemes can perform effectively, and the kinds 
of situations where intensive pre-release investigation is justified. Only when we 
begin to blend the results of such studies in the careful design of integrated risk 
management strategies will we be able to move much beyond the present 
unsatisfactory state of regulation by polemic. 
Finally, appropriate blends of risk assessment tactics are not likely to emerge 
from even the most sophisticated contemplation. We will have to learn to make 
efficient diagnostic use of the different empirical experiences emerging in different 
countries under different regulatory approaches. This brings us almost full circle to 
the notion of "adaptive risk management" already suggested by historical 
experience in resource management. In the final sections of this paper, I shall 
attempt to close that and other circles suggested by this survey of historical 
perspectives, and to suggest some general directions for future work in risk assess-
ment. 
WHAT ARE WE ARGUING ABOUT? 
The various attitudes towards the unknown suggested in my historical reviews 
were captured nearly a hundred years ago by Frank Richard Stockton in his studies 
on the ancient myth of The Lady or the Tiger?*[33]: 
The young man could open either door he pleased. If he opened the one, 
there came out of it a hungry tiger, the fiercest and most cruel that could be 
procured, which would immediately tear him to pieces. But if he opened the 
other door, there came forth from it a lady; the most suitable to his years and 
station that His Majesty could select among his fair subjects. So I leave it to 
you, which door to open? 
The first man refused to take the chance. He lived safe and died chaste. 
The second man hired risk assessment consultants. He collected all the 
available data on lady and tiger populations. He brought in sophisticated tech-
nology to listen for growling and detect the faintest whiff of perfume. He 
completed checklists. He developed a utility function and assessed his risk 
averseness. Finally, sensing that in a few more years he would be in no condi-
tion to enjoy the lady anyway, he opened the optimal door. And was eaten by 
a low probability tiger. 
The third man took a course in tiger taming. He opened a door at random 
and was eaten by the lady. 
•Stockton's initial translation of 1884 has been questioned on several grounds, but remains the most complete 
version available. I have used his work for the first paragraph quoted here, but employ some of the more credi-
ble alternatives for its variant endings, following the reasoning I developed in an earlier study of the myth [34}. 
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To interpret, we respond to the unknown by trying to retreat from it, or trying to 
comprehend it, or trying to control it. The first approach is evident in longings for 
return to a simpler "risk-free" life that never was. The second is reflected in the 
fantasy of synoptic risk assessment: Measure the requisite probabilities and trade-
offs, calculate the social risk-benefit function, and the common good will have 
been defined. The third approach is in the tradition of professional engineering. It 
serves us well, but as engineers have been among the first to point out [35], it has 
met its match and more in the complex social risk problems it increasingly is called 
upon to address. 
All of these traditions have one thing in common. They set themselves in 
opposition to the unknown and try to overcome or control it, thereby hoping to 
establish a more predictable and less frightening world. The history of risk manage-
ment shows the inadequacy of this approach. The unknown is not a wrinkle to be 
ironed out of the social fabric. The analysis that predicts the tiger will always be 
surprised by a carnivorous lady. Our ignorance will always remain greater than our 
knowledge. 
Fortunately, none of this need present really serious obstacles to effective cop-
ing with the unknown. There is an alternative tradition of coping which, though 
virtually absent from the contemporary risk debate, has nonetheless long been a 
practical mainstay of successful coping in man and beast. This tradition accepts the 
inevitability of incomplete knowledge, seeks to accommodate rather than control 
the unknown, and thereby aims to coexist with and prosper from surprise. In this 
tradition, the "risk problem" is not uncertainty of outcome, or violence of event, 
or toxicity of substance, or anything of the kind. Instead, it is the challenge of cop-
ing confidently, effectively, and creatively with the surprising world around us. 
The fundamental question is not how to calculate, control, or even reduce risk. It is 
how to increase our risk-taking abilities. 
Nowhere is this distinction clearer than in the questions of medical drug safety 
which I reviewed above. By any imaginable criteria, the complex, biologically 
active compounds generated by modern pharmaceutical concerns are risky things 
indeed. The sheer volume of production is frightening enough. Add the high pro-
portion of that production that comes into contact with humans and you have a 
situation bound to dispatch a modern risk assessor for his injunctions and press 
agents. In the medical drug case, however, the existence of a professional 
managerial framework within which these dangerous chemicals are characterized 
and administered and monitored makes them into risks we can afford to take, 
thereby improving our health and well-being. Any narrow attempt to create a 
world free from the very real risks posed by such chemicals would entail obviously 
unacceptable consequences. Moreover, since many drugs are now most valuable in 
roles for which they were not originally envisioned, any preemptive risk-benefit 
accounting would produce similarly unfortunate results . In contrast, improve-
ments in our ability to take risks - in our knowledge of how the drugs confer their 
risks and benefits, in doctors' and patients' understanding of the trade-offs 
involved, in the monitoring and diagnosis of unanticipated (positive and negative) 
drug reactions - all increase our capacity to cope with disease and improve our 
health. 
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A similar emphasis on increased risk-taking abilities, rather than decreased risk 
per se, emerges as a strategy for coping with the unknown in a number of prag-
matic fields which have tried the alternatives. Portfolio designers long ago recog-
nized the fallacies of "risk-free" earning strategies (36). Boehm-Bawerk's Law, 
based on one of the most rigorous theorems in economics, states that existing 
means of production can yield greater economic performance only through greater 
uncertainty - i.e. through taking greater risks. Strategic corporate planning has 
been defined by one of its most successful advocates as creating the "capacity to 
take a greater risk, for this is the only way to improve entrepreneurial perfor-
mance" (37). Most biologists, myself included, would concur with W. H. Auden's 
poem "Unpredictable but Providential", wishing only that we had put the central 
experience of our discipline so well: 
. . . for the animate, to last was to mean to change, 
existing both for one's own sake and that of all others, 
forever in jeopardy . . . 
As a rule it was the fittest who perished, the misfits, 
forced by failure to emigrate to new unsettled niches, who 
altered their structure and prospered . . . 
Rene Dubos states the biologists' conclusion more bluntly (38]: "Willingness to 
take risks is a condition of biological success." This point is critical to our unders-
tanding of human risk-taking. Willingness to take risks, together with knowledge 
of risk-taking consequences, determines our ability to cope with the unknown. 
Confidence is as important as understanding if we are to shape the future in a 
rational way. The real challenge for the "new professional interest in risk" is to 
contribute to both. 
In seeking to meet this challenge, it is reasonable to begin with the paradox of 
contemporary social risk history: The more we learn about risk the less confident 
we seem to be of our risk-taking abilities. Hence we have the spectacle of an 
American society which has a greater life expectancy, higher level of material 
welfare, and more knowledge than ever before, frightening itself into virtual 
catatonia, unable to mobilize the risk-taking efforts necessary for coping with the 
unknown. A "new professional interest in risk" which cannot bring itself to 
address, much less explain, such a central fact of its subject is hardly a thing to 
inspire confidence. 
Nobody knows what makes one individual or society believe in itself while 
another heads for the bunkers.* After all, Columbus was venturing into the void at 
the same time Institor and Sprenger were inciting witch hunters to new heights of 
paranoia. It seems virtually certain, however, that risk assessors' sincere 
knowledge-seeking efforts to identify potential dangers can undermine the very 
confidence which would be necessary for creatively coping with those dangers. 
The proverbial "little knowledge" is both a dangerous and a frightening thing. 
We have already seen the workings of this in the witch hunts of the Renaissance. 
Authoritative and, let us presume, sincere preachers preached valiantly the 
dangers of witches and of the devil's incredibly subtle and cunning ways of 
infiltrating society. In so doing, they amplified society's latent fear of the 
*For some provoking thoughts on the subject, see Gardner {39}. 
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unknown, undermined its confidence, cohesion, and common sense, and thereby 
contributed to the public hysteria which later fuelled the excesses of the Inquisi-
tion. Today, authoritative and, let us presume, sincere scientists preach valiantly 
the dangers of risks and their incredibly subtle and cunning ways of infiltrating 
society. The Chief Counsel of the Food and Drug Administration admits "we 
often regulate more out of fear of the unknown than out of respect and apprecia-
tion of the known" [40, p. 123). Society's attitudes towards risks such as cancer 
and nuclear reactors are not readily distinguishable from its earlier fears of the evil 
eye. 
This is not to say that today's society does not face real risks, nor to deny the real 
accomplishment of risk management professionals in dealing with those risks. It is 
to insist that the dual character of the coping problem - the need for knowing and 
willing - is virtually ignored in contemporary literature on the risk problem.• 
Preoccupied with the knowledge aspects of early warnings and assessments, we are 
caught inside the risk problem and become part of it. Unable to see the relationship 
between our knowledge-seeking work and the fear of the unknown it may 
engender, our contributions to the real problem of enhancing society's risk-taking 
and coping abilities are correspondingly dissipated or flatly counterproductive. 
The challenge of establishing a rational perspective from which to view risk prob-
lems and our interventions in them is, however, greater than merely coming to 
understand the relationship between fear and knowledge. 
Alvin Weinberg provided the glimmer of such a perspective in his concept of 
"trans-science", first enunciated in a discussion of "How safe is safe enough?" for 
nuclear reactors [43): 
Attempts to deal with social problems through the procedures of science 
hang on the answers to questions which can be asked of science and yet which 
cannot be answered by science. I propose the term trans-scientific for these 
questions . .. Insofar as public policy depends on trans-scientific rather than 
scientific issues, the role of the scientists in contributing to the promulgation 
of such policy must be different than is his role when the issues can be unam-
biguously answered by science ... When what we do transcends science and 
when it impinges on the public, we have no choice but to welcome the public 
- even encourage the public - to participate in the debate. Scientists have 
no monopoly on wisdom where this kind of trans-science is involved; they 
shall have to accommodate the will of the public and its representatives. 
What is this "different role" required of the risk scientist? How is he to promote 
scientific knowledge without spreading social fear? How is the "will of the public" 
to be accommodated in risk problems? Neither Weinberg nor anyone else has pro-
posed definitive answers tQ these questions, but in the last several years several 
lines of inquiry have been opened. 
•The problem is not unique to risk studies. Lindblom {41} distinguishes between the knowledge-based 
preferences which inform economic theory, and the will-based volitions which, together with preferences, 
inform political choice. In a penetrating essay on the nature of useful knowledge {42}, he characterizes these 
two complementary forms of social evaluation as "thinking through" and "acting out". 
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In reviewing these, it seems to me that there are two distinct if related issues at 
stake. One concerns the incompleteness of scientific understanding which can be 
brought to bear on risk questions. The other involves the conflicts of individual 
wills, values, and freedoms which bear on those questions. 
TOWARDS THE ADAPTIVE DESIGN OF RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY 
Let us first consider the problem of incompleteness. In mature academic 
science, the incompleteness and fallibility of knowledge should cause no funda-
mental difficulties. Theories are held tentatively, contingent on new evidence. 
Contrary evidence and new interpretations are granted equal access to the debate. 
Independent experiment and peer review provide checks and balances against 
error and unscrupulous behavior. Of course the ideal standard is often bent or 
broken in practice, but in the long run, in the majority of cases, good science does 
seem to replace bad.• 
This is not the case, however, in what historian Jerome Ravetz has called the 
less developed or "immature" sciences, especially when those sciences are applied 
to social problems (45] . In such circumstances a variety of factors conspire to sup-
press tentative outlooks and to seize on incompleteness as an excuse for polariza-
tion. The result is bad science, leading to unnecessary public alarm, unjustified and 
ineffective regulations, and an unwillingness to undertake the risk-taking ventures 
necessary for coping with the unknown (46]. 
In part, the phenomenon can be explained in terms of a breakdown of quality 
control within the scientific discipline. The relative absence of established facts or 
criteria of competence tends to make peer review ineffective. Add the pull of a 
socially relevant, "public interest" discipline, and there is a real danger that the 
field will experience "an accretion of cranks and congenital rebels whose reform-
ing zeal is not matched by their scientific skill" (45, p. 427]. Where recognition 
and grant money both accrue to those making the first, loudest, and most frighten-
ing noises, where accusations of corruption, cowardice, or insensitivity are the 
most likely rewards of the careful skeptic, then the "great confidence game" 
portrayed by Ravetz cannot be far off. 
The fault, however, does not all lie with science. Harvey Brooks has pointed out 
. .. an interesting parallel between the scientist's desire to establish 
priority for a discovery or invention, and the politician's search for new issues 
on which he can make a name for himself ... The potential alliance between 
individual politicians and scientists, though often beneficial, can also be 
dangerous because neither side is subject to the normal checks and balances 
of peer groups. Once a politician has staked out scientific territory for him-
self, his colleagues tend to stay away. At the same time the scientisit is speak-
ing in a forum to which opposing scientific views are not more or less 
automatically accorded equal access. The politician is free to select his own 
"Unfortunately, it also often displaces the merely different. For a particularly readable and disturbing account 
of Inquisitorial intolerance in modern science, see Feyerabend [44}. 
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experts to develop an issue in the way that has maximum political utility to 
him. Truth may be only incidental [ 4 7, p. 25~]. * 
Even the most conscientious risk scientist, trying to present a balanced view of a 
complex and uncertain issue, is likely to find his argument caricatured and 
polarized in such a process. Brooks continues: 
Scientists inexperienced in the political arena, and flattered by the unac-
customed attentions of men of power, are often inveigled into stating their 
conclusions with a confidence not warranted by the evidence, and .... not 
subject to the same sort of prompt corrective processes that they would be if 
confined within the scientific community (47, p. 259)** 
While these and other problems of the incomplete scientific knowledge in risk 
matters are widely recognized, most responses have essentially called for a resol-
tion through better science. This misses the central issue completely. Thus we 
have the 1976 Bellagio Conference on Science and Technology calling for the 
scientific community to "evolve and sustain new standards of scientific rigor 
appropriate to research in support of early warnings and policy decisions" (49, p. 
33). Or, for those with less faith in their fellow scientists, there are the science 
court proposals for what amounts to super-peer review (50). In both cases, the 
underlying assumption seems to be that rigorous science, or rigorously reviewed 
science, would not be subject to the incompleteness, polarization, and exploitation 
that characterizes risk science today. With all respect to good intentions, the 
historical experience of risk management*** makes this assumption hard to accept. 
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, response to the incompleteness 
dilemmas of trans-science is provided by the growing craft of policy analysis. In a 
recent Science editorial on the subject, M. Granger Morgan argues 
Good policy analysis recognizes that physical truth may be poorly or 
incompletely known. Its objective is to evaluate, order, and structure 
incomplete knowledge so as to allow decisions to be made with as complete 
an understanding as possible of the current state of knowledge, its limita-
tions, and its implications (51, p. 971). 
Policy analysis of the sort Morgan describes is just beginning to emerge from its 
uninspiring past as a branch of applied mathematics. There are indications, non-
etheless, that it does indeed off er a realistic and rational perspective from which 
Weinberg's trans-scientist can shape his "different role" in the social risk 
debate.*"'** 
*Brooks draws the latter part of his suggestion from the studies of Ne/kin /481. 
**The difficulties encountered in scientists' statements to the media are similar in kind and origin, and even 
more sensational in outcome. 
***/ would argue, for example, that risk management of medical drugs already has both the "rigorous stan-
dards" of Bel/agio and the super-peer review of the science courts. The debate is none the less acrimonious. 
****The remainder of this section draws heavily on the concepts of policy analysis as developed by Majone [52], 
Wildavsky [53}, and Lindblom [54}. For another more formal view see Quade [55]. 
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In some ways, this role seems likely to take on more the character of a jurist than 
a traditional positivist scientist. Policy analysis recognizes, above all else, that "the 
data" are always insufficient to dictate unambiguous conclusions. Rather, particu-
lar data are generated, selected, and inserted into an argument as evidence in sup-
port of a particular conclusion [52). The listener may be persuaded by the force of 
the argument and the strength of its evidence. But there is no suggestion that data 
of themselves are either necessary or sufficient to a given conclusion. The debate 
therefore shifts away from a preoccupation with "facts" and their "proof'. It turns 
instead to the careful development of rules for the admissibility of legitimate evi-
dence, and for the form oflegitimate argument. Such rules are known to be fallible 
- the guilty can be acquitted and vice versa - but fallibility is accepted as an 
inevitable consequence of our lack of omniscience. On the other hand, careful 
attention to developing mutually agreed-upon rules of evidence can create that 
essential willingness to proceed in the face of fallibility. It has done this for drug 
regulation, and our health is the better for it. Attention to rules of evidence can 
also assure against the wilder tyrannies of self-evident "fact" where no effective 
peer review exists. It did this in Alonso y Frias' reforms of the Inquisition's torture 
and indictment procedures. Perhaps most important, formal rules of evidence con-
stitute formal hypotheses on how we can best cope with the unknown. Viewed in 
this manner, they invite us to use our continuing experience in risk management 
to evaluate our present rules, and to suggest improvements in them. We therefore 
can learn from both our successes and our failures and hope for some cumulative 
improvement in our risk-taking, surprise-coping abilities. Contemporary risk 
management's inability to effect such cumulative improvements, its insistence on 
re-fighting all the old battles with each new risk issue, is one of the most discourag-
ing aspects of its exclusively "fact"-focussed approach. 
The notion of learning from error is central to modern policy analysis, as it is to 
those pragmatic coping strategies of man and beast which I outlined earlier. The 
litany goes something like this: If knowledge is incomplete, if the future is uncer-
tain, then mistakes and surprise are inevitable. The categorical imperative is to 
recognize such mistakes, to learn from them, and to modify future actions accor-
dingly.* 
In this view of life, rationality becomes a retrospective but still respectable con-
cept. Since actual performance is contingent on facts unknown, futures unborn, 
and choices we ourselves have yet to make, the "rational" is evident only in 
retrospect. It is what turned out to be adapted to the conditions that occurred, and 
turned out to be adopted by the powers that were [52). 
The problem of rational management is therefore to design self-evaluating 
policies which adapt themselves to the developing situation and, in so doing, culti-
vate the will necessary for their adoption and continuing pursuit. Such a 
reconstructive concept of rationality is central to evolutionary (as opposed to 
teleological) thinking in a number of fields [52). Its appropriateness as a guide to 
action has been argued in terms of social psychology [56), economic theory [57], 
and the purest of scientific endeavor [58). Furthermore, as Majone points out, 
•ft has been said that a fool makes many mistakes, while a damn fool makes only one. Over and over again. 
WITCHES, FLOODS, AND WONDER DRUGS 309 
This explanation makes sense of behavior frequently observed among 
policy makers - such as incrementalism, adaptive adjustments, imitation, 
and "rationalizations" - which must appear to be irrational and/or dis-
honest in the prevailing models of policymaking (52, p. 215). 
Those "prevailing models", unfortunately, are the ones which inform a good pro-
portion of contemporary risk management activity. The synoptic planners, cost-
benefit analysts, and regulatoiy bureaucrats seem wedded to prospective, 
knowledge-presuming notions of "rationality" in policy making: "Optimal" or 
"best possible" decisions and decision-rules are derived on the basis of available 
information, and implemented by virtue of their rationality (social optimality, 
expert consensus). Subsequent performance can be taken for granted, provided 
always that compliance with the rational rules is rigorously enforced. 
If this sounds too extreme a caricature of present practice, try any other one that 
comes to mind. Michael Crozier, in his classic study of The Bureaucratic 
Phenomenon, defines bureaucracy as "an organization that cannot correct its 
behavior by learning from its mistakes" (59, pp. 186-187). Regulation by such 
bureaucracies has become almost synonymous with risk management in America 
today. From the policy analysis perspective, with its insistence on an adaptive, 
"error-embracing"* response to the unknown, it therefore comes as no surprise 
that risk management is in trouble. More constructively, policy analysis suggests 
that effective, rational coping behavior may depend more than anything on our 
ability to design flexible, adaptive management institutions:** Institutions which 
can respond to and learn from the inevitable surprises awaiting us. Institutions 
which can mobilize public will in risk-taking enterprises. Institutions which can 
improve our ability to cope with the unknown. 
Explicit policy analysis focussed on design of alternative institutional structures 
for risk management has barely begun. The sterile debates over "regulate" versus 
"don't", "threshold" versus "not", and the like have so far occupied center stage 
and most of the wings (321. Some of the notable exceptions include Michael's (60) 
and Thompson's (this symposium) studies from the human behavior perspective, 
the comparative institutional studies I referred to in the discussion on medical drug 
regulation, plus those ofNelkin reported elsewhere in this symposium, the explicit 
policy analyses of Majone (61, 62, 63), and the applied work being done under the 
several banners of "mediation" (64, 65). These suggest a productive future for 
policy analyses of risk problems and their institutional settings, if only the debate 
can be turned in the constructive directions they have suggested. 
What that future will be like I am not so silly as to suggest in a paper emphasizing 
uncertainty and surprise. My personal favorite for attention concerns the "scale" 
of our risk management institutions and arrangements. There is a strong tendency 
•The term is from Michael's {60} insightful study of the human aspects of Learning to Plan and Planning to 
Learn. 
••Significantly, this was also the overriding need identified by the previously mentioned Bellagio Conference 011 
Science and Technology; See {24]. 
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today for every fear, every unknown to be met by mandatory regulation at a 
national or even supernatural scale. 
This approach might possibly be justified in a world where one socially optimal 
regulation could be computed in advance, or where the externalities of local risk-
taking decisions would be truly national in scope and unbearable in effect. It might, 
in general, be justified if everyone wanted it. But in most cases of risk manage-
ment, not one of these conditions is met. 
An opposite extreme, less well explored, is a variation on the thousand flowers 
blooming approach to cultural revival. I suspect a careful policy analysis would 
show that maximal social learning and political will could be mobilized by design-
ing the scale of particular risk management ventures to fit the character of the risk 
under consideration. Thus while we might require regional scale regulation in such 
externality-laden fields as air quality management, we might find that much 
smaller scales - and therefore more, different learning experiments and less com-
pulsion - would be appropriate in other cases. 
Medical drugs, for example, would seem to present the perfect situation for 
experimenting with much more "local" autonomy in risk management decisions, 
even down to the level of the individual. My finer fancies imagine the Generally 
Recognized as Safe (GRAS) list of drugs being complemented by one General 
Recognized as Uncertain (GRAU). Use of drugs on the GRAU list might be at the 
user's discretion, with a full description of the known risks and benefits available 
as advice, but a minimum of absolute constraint. The liabilities issue would be 
difficult, but could doubtless be resolved with sufficient ingenuity. Appropriate, 
perhaps, would be voluntary "de-socialization" of the risk in the form of an agree-
ment not to hold the manufacturer accountable or insurance agencies liable for 
adverse effects. I can imagine circumstances under which I would agree to such 
conditions, just as I can imagine preferring the de-socialiation of excommunication 
to the alternative of a witch trial. 
The more general point is that to the extent that large-scale monolithic regula-
tions can be avoided, "local" risk-taking preferences can be left to run their course 
as experiments in risk management. Government can shift from its stressful role 
as incompetent regulator into a more congenial role as broker of information. Is 
California's (or San Francisco's, or J. Fred Muggs') approach to Laetrile working 
better than New York's? In what ways? Who has a third approach? And so on. 
Note that the apparent ethical dilemma in fact is less than it seems. If we really 
don't know how to manage a risk, then we're all guinea pigs. The fight over whose 
expert to believe can be transposed into a contest over whose expert guessed bet-
ter, and learns faster. 
The challenges of helping to design alternative - even competitive - coping 
strategies and institutions, of evaluating and comparing their actual performances, 
and of redesigning adaptively in response to what is learned should be enough to 
satisfy the most ambitious of risk policy analysts. They might even help to make 
the future of risk management a more satisfactory endeavour than its past and pre-
sent. 
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